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Autonomy, Candour and Professional Teacher Practice:  
A Discussion Inspired by the Later Works of Michel Foucault 
 
Autonomy is considered to be an important feature of professionals and provide a necessary 
basis for their informed judgments. In this essay these notions will be challenged. I will use 
Michel Foucault’s deconstruction of the idea of the autonomous citizen, and his later attempts 
to reconstruct that idea, in order to bring some new perspectives to the discussion about the 
foundation of professionalism. The turning point in Foucault’s discussion about autonomy is 
to be found in his proposal for an ethics of the self. This ethics invites to a break with the 
normalizing discourses of modernity. As I see it, this makes it particularly relevant in a 
discussion about the principles of professionalism. The conception of parrhesia is here 
central. I will use the role of the teacher to illustrate my arguments. 
 
Will frank, independent and informed speech necessarily influence individuals to make wiser 
decisions? In research on professions and the education of professionals, this question has to 
do with how expert knowledge is applied and how professionals use their autonomy to serve 
their clients’ best interests, so that they can eventually take better care of themselves. 
Foucault’s works, and particularly his later works, offer a rich fund of critical ideas for 
discussion of such issues. Numerous books have applied Foucault’s theories and methods to 
educational questions (e.g., Ball 1990, Marshall 1996, Blades 1997, Popkewitz & Brennan 
1998, Olssen 1999, Baker 2001). Relatively few books however probe his understanding of 
frankness (parrhesia), self-construction and autonomy in the context of education. In a 
number of studies (Peters 2003, Franchi 2004, Luxon 2004, Besley 2005, Huskaby 2007, 
Papadimos & Murray 2008) there is a discussion of parrhesia, but not an investigation of the 
significance of Foucault’s terms for the analysis of teachers’ professional practice. In this 
paper I will explore this topic, especially the relevance of using parrhesia. An individual who 
applies parrhesia is not necessarily a professional. According to Foucault parrhesia is, above 
all, a manner of being that develops out of virtue (Foucault 1983, out of an ethics for the self. 
By contrast, professionals’ practice is primarily legitimised by how professionals apply a set 
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of professional and legal norms, not by their personal moral integrity. However, parrhesia can 
play an important part in the practice of professional autonomy, as this article will show. An 
understanding of the relevance of Foucault’s view of parrhesia for professional practice 
presupposes knowledge of his early conceptions about discipline, normalisation and 
autonomy.  
 
Autonomy in Teaching: A Foucauldian Perspective 
Chambliss (1977) claims that professionals offer their expert knowledge to serve others in 
exchange for the right to regulate their own activity. This right to regulate one’s own activity 
is commonly termed professional autonomy. In contrast to laypeople it gives professionals 
legitimacy and a power within their jurisdiction to define what is right and true to do. 
Foucault, however, addresses the question of autonomy differently.  
 
In his early writing, Foucault considered autonomy in many respects to be an illusion. 
Foucault’s (1973, 1980) point of departure is historical. Industrialisation has liberated humans 
from feudal society’s traditional forms of stratification. For individuals this liberation means 
opportunities to make individual choices. However, Foucault (1980: 132-133) believed that an 
apparent rather than a real increase in independence occurred; one constrained by what he 
called ‘regimes of truth’. Individuals have made the society’s disciplinary techniques and 
ruling ways of thinking very much their own and, by doing so, have come to believe and 
behave as if they were free and autonomous (Foucault 1986: 221). Foucault (1977) proposed 
that this is also the case for professionals. A well-functioning and independently acting 
professional will typically accommodate to an institutional setting, and act as expected in that 
setting. External control of how professionals use their time at work contributes to the 
regulation of their activities. Foucault (1977: 135-169) showed how individuals in their work 
are brought together in different combinations, supported by various regimes of comparison, 
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inclusion and exclusion. He (1977: 160) described this bringing together of individuals in 
different combinations in a school setting as a ‘seriation’ of teachers and students in 
successive activities in different stages, classes and groups that makes possible a detailed 
control and regular intervention of differentiation, correction, punishment and elimination. 
According to Foucault (1973: 312, 344-345), such procedures give individuals an 
understanding of who they are and what they are capable of: They are objects for knowledge 
and subjects who know. 
 
Empirical research supports such an understanding of the professionals’ functional role. 
Researchers have documented how professions as a particular category in Western societies 
are in the process of being undermined by organisational, economic and political changes, 
which in turn implies a reduction in their level of autonomy and opportunity to control their 
own work (Hargreaves 1994, Campbell et al., 1991). As a result of these changes, some have 
claimed that professionalism is being redefined. Another argument has been that state 
authorities seek to make professions more commercially viable, more focused on budgetary 
requirements and management (Reed 1996, Freidson 1988, 1994, MacDonald 1995, Evetts 
2003). This assertion also seems to apply to the teaching profession. Teachers must, to an 
increasing degree, demonstrate the achievement of external, and often politically defined, 
goals within steadily more managerially oriented school organisations (Campbell etal., 1991, 
Karlsen 1993, 2002, Hargreaves, 1994, Raaen 2002). Curriculum plans and regulations that 
define teaching content are, according to some researchers, considered to limit, rather than 
encourage, the independence of teachers (Groundwater-Smith & Sachs 2002, Pink 1991). 
Furthermore, they claim that the standardisation of tests and examinations has made teachers 
focus on a limited selection of possible topics that they would otherwise want to present to 
their students. Research has suggested that the teachers’ possibilities for professional 
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development are consequently narrowed (Ball 1994, Mahony & Hextall 2000, Groundwater-
Smith & Sachs 2002). This narrowing of the teachers’ possibilities may lead to a further 
restriction of the teachers’ opportunities to demonstrate their own pedagogical capabilities and 
to stimulate their students’ critical thinking (Pink 1990). Where teachers acquiesce in such 
disciplinary techniques, Foucault (1973: 318, 1980: 106) suggests that they come to see 
themselves as independent and autonomous actors, even if they are not. 
 
Foucault’s (1980: 98) position in his early works was that power must be analysed as 
something which circulates in the form of a chain. Individuals are the vehicles of power, not 
its points of application. School is one setting where this type of situation occurs. Teachers are 
normally allowed to promote their expert knowledge as long as it is in accordance with the 
aims and objectives of the school and is consistent with what is regarded as normal, true and 
right (as opposed to deviant, false and wrong). Foucault (1977: 191-194) argued that when 
teachers convince students to accept without critical objection these assumptions and to 
confess their weaknesses and problems, the students accept an inferior role as cases for 
disciplinary action by professional teachers (1988: 46-49). In so doing the students contribute 
to a reproduction of the professional teachers’ authority. Foucault (1977: 184) describes this 
as part of a process of normalisation.  
 
Reconstruction of professional autonomy: The teachers’ power to act 
In his early works, Foucault described individuals as historicised and disciplined and as part 
of a continuous normalisation, regulated by different regimes of truth. According to this 
conception, individuals have little room for freedom of action. By contrast, in Foucault’s later 
works, individuals’ freedom is considered an essential part of their constitution. However, for 
Foucault (1991: 1-2) this change represented more of a change in focus than a break from an 
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earlier position. The change lies in a marked contrast in how he deals with topics such as 
normalisation, freedom of action and truth in his earlier and later works. Foucault, in his later 
works, became increasingly interested in how normalisation is not only part of society’s 
disciplinary techniques and ruling ways of thinking but also part of the subject’s own active 
engagement and ways of reasoning. Foucault (1988: 16) described these methods and tools of 
normalisation as ’technologies of the self’. It would be a mistake to interpret Foucault’s ideas 
to mean that professionals have totally lost control over the ownership of their professional 
knowledge, that they have no power to define the nature of the problems they face, or that 
they are without rights to determine access to possible solutions.  
 
In a 1984 article, Foucault made way for a reconstruction of autonomy. In line with his earlier 
works (1984: 45-50) he put forward the following argument: Because knowledge does not  
exist independently of relations of power, one must give up the hope of adopting an external 
position that provides access to definite and complete knowledge of what constitutes the 
limits of our understanding. According to Foucault, one can, however, seek knowledge about 
the circumstances that have influenced one’s way of thinking. He claimed that this quest can 
be the basis for a critical discussion and analysis of the limitations of one’s understanding. 
Foucault maintained that such a discussion can be used as a foundation for conducting a 
practical historical critique and analysis, directed towards possible transgressions, and for 
testing what it can mean to move beyond the limits imposed upon one’s work. Consequently, 
the point for Foucault is not to reveal truth in an essential sense but rather to explore how one 
relates to, applies and practises a set of truths or general principles with which one is familiar. 
For Foucault (1984) this implies ‘a permanent critique of ourselves in our autonomy’ (p. 44); 
‘a historical ontology of ourselves’ (p. 45); and giving ‘new impetus ... to the undefined work 
of freedom’ (p. 46). 
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For teachers, this has to do with how they relate to the formal limits of their work – namely, 
curriculum goals, the administrative apparatus and relevant laws. Knowledge of how they 
relate to the formal limits of their work will reveal whether they actually exploit the space 
given by the formal structure and to what extent they use their opportunities to investigate 
critically the obstacles to such exploitation. Freedom and autonomy then become relative 
concepts that are connected to one’s capacity and power to act in a certain context (Garland 
1997), which Foucault (1983, 1991) described  as being intimately connected with one’s 
opportunities to oppose power and to challenge knowledge regimes. When Foucault (1983, 
1991) reflected on power, power relations and autonomy in his later works, he drew heavily 
upon the ethical practice of the Greeks and the Romans in classical times. In what follows 
Foucault’s elaborations will be used as a backdrop for discussing possible implications for 
teachers’ personal autonomy and professional practice. 
 
Foucault (1983: 65; 1988: 19-39) believed that the ancient Greeks are examples of an 
outspoken, independent existence, which is also possible to achieve today. According to 
Foucault, it is possible to compose one’s own life in ways that can break with modernity’s 
normalising discourses, thus opening up for the development of a more reflective personal 
autonomy. Ancient Greek society, he argues (1991: 4-5), provides good insights for how one 
can develop an ethical basis for self-liberation. Foucault (1991: 3) did not seek an ethics that 
frees individuals from society’s web of power. On his analysis, the desire to develop societies 
or institutions that are not regulated by power is utopian. Foucault’s (1991: 19-20) ambitions 
were more modest. He suggested that one instead concentrate on exploring how laws, 
management techniques, ethics and ways of practising the self can allow power to be played 
out in society, with a minimum of dominance. As a consequence, an ethical system is 
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developed that can make way for an autonomy based on an outspoken and critical thinking 
that breaks with the normalisation pressure faced by individuals in today’s society. I will use 
school teachers to illustrate this point, and to show how parrhesia can play an important role 
in their practice of professional autonomy and in the empowerment of their students.  
 
The concept of parrhesia: Some educational implications  
According to Foucault (1983: 2), it is common to translate parrhesia as ’free speech’ or 
’frankness’ (franc-parler in French, Freimüthigkeit in German). A parrhesiastes is one who 
uses parrhesia (i.e., one who conducts oneself in an honourable fashion and says straight out 
what one considers to be the truth). Thus, it is not enough for individuals who practise 
parrhesia to be honourable: they must also be frank when expressing the truth. Foucault 
(1983: 3) contended that the practice of parrhesia was regarded in classical times as a moral 
obligation and a personal virtue. Autonomy was thought to require individuals to possess a 
certain dominance or mastery over themselves so as to free them from ending up as slaves to 
their own lusts (Foucault 1983: 5). Foucault (1991) described this classical reasoning as 
especially relevant to the reconstruction of a modern, critically reflective self. This classical 
reasoning contrasts with the widely-held belief in our times that the self is organised around 
self-indulgence, egoism and self-interest (Bernauer & Rasmussen 1991). According to 
Foucault, being free and autonomous implies breaking with such a view and instead 
cultivatiing parrhesia, which involves combining a caring for the self with attentiveness and 
caring for others. For Foucault (1983: 54-55), this ‘ethics for the self’ is closely connected 
with askesis. Foucault relied not on the Christian but rather on the traditional Greco-Roman 
understanding of the word. To the Greco-Roman philosophers, moral askesis implied 
establishing a relationship to oneself and one’s fellow citizens based on ‘self-possession and 
self-sovereignty’. Furthermore, the ascetic practices of the Greco-Roman philosophers 
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implied that the individual should be morally prepared to confront the world ’in an ethical and 
rational manner’ (1983: 55). Hence, autonomy and self-construction are not primarily matters 
of private concern for the individual. They are social in nature and can be developed and 
reconstructed only through self-conscious confrontations with the challenges of social 
existence, together with other people. According to these terms, Foucault viewed ascetic 
practice as part of parrhesia. Thus, central is each individual’s personal moral and existential 
relation to himself/herself, to other people and to society.  
 
The aims of parrhesia are to secure one’s independence and then the independence of others 
and to avert stagnation. For example, Socrates told the mighty Alcibiades that before he can 
take care of Athens he must first learn to take care of himself (Foucault 1983: 7). This 
example illustrates how individuals should conduct themselves. In classical times, those 
individuals who did not advance towards truth through their own life and work, were said to 
be in danger of losing the rules by which individuals conduct their lives (i.e., losing 
autonomy). Those individuals robbed of parrhesia were viewed to be in the same situation as 
a slave, that is, a non-autonomous individual, because individuals who were unable to enter 
into a parrhesiastic conversation were considered incapable of being part of a real democratic 
political life (Foucault 1983: 6). This reasoning also implied that they were deprived of the 
possibility of developing their character and strengthening their reflective autonomy. To 
promote a fellow citizen’s independent self-construction, individuals who practise parrhesia 
have to provide a precise account of what they are thinking so that the listener(s) can 
understand what their true meaning is (Foucault 1983: 3, 6). Thus, individuals who practise 
parrhesia must avoid any form of rhetoric when speaking that might obscure what they mean. 
A parrhesiastes therefore uses the most direct words and forms of expression that can be 
found to communicate what he/she considers true (Foucault 1983: 2). Parrhesia implies a 
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personal commitment: Those individuals who practise parrhesia believe they can offer their 
conversation partners something new, different or strange that will expand the conversation 
partners’  horizons and the scope of their autonomy and provide them with space for greater 
understanding and self-mastery. Individuals’ free, autonomous speech can bring new truth to 
people, thus strengthening their insight and making them better able to take care of 
themselves and others (Foucault 1983: 40-41).  
 
However, the ethics of parrhesia do not imply that a teacher dedicated to parrhesia should 
tell the truth no matter what. A logical consequence of an ethical system based on care for the 
self is that if parrhesia is not believed to promote that type of ethics, it should not be 
practised. On the one hand, it can be argued that this ethics of care is inconsistent because it 
implies self-disclosure and the possibility of seriously hurting another individual in a frank 
confrontation (which is certainly true). On the other hand, it presupposes that a less mighty 
person is willing to practise it or that a mightier person is willing to seek advice. Parrhesia 
can also be based on a mutual agreement to engage in it. This topic will be discussed further. 
Moreover, there are some good reasons for encouraging self-disclosure. Self-disclosure often 
happens when individuals initially meet and continues as relationships are built and 
developed. As individuals get to know each other, they disclose information about 
themselves. Self-disclosure is an important building block for intimacy; intimacy cannot be 
achieved without it. What is inspiring about parrhesia is precisely that it seeks in a frank but 
caring and prudent way to inform individuals and their fellow citizens about the consequences 
of their thinking, reasoning and lifestyle that are at stake. 
 
Teachers may practise parrhesia in different ways. Parents’ and students’ levels of trust in 
teachers are based on their experience as to whether the teachers speak frankly, directly and 
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openly about their knowledge of their students or whether they give vague and approximate 
statements. Hence, the trustworthiness of teachers is confirmed by their candour (Bryk & 
Schneider 2002). By speaking with candour about the different beliefs, values and interests 
that their students have, teachers may also ensure that there is space for competing views 
about what constitutes a good life and a good society (Gutmann 1987). The latter is highly 
relevant in a multicultural context in which teachers often operate. Acting with candour is not 
necessarily risky for teachers, but it may be. If students do not like certain teachers’ frankness, 
they may directly or subtly hamper these teachers’ educative initiatives, thereby undermining 
their professional legitimacy. If parents find the candour of certain teachers to be provocative, 
they may sue or seek to dismiss these teachers. How teachers can meet such challenges and 
retain parrhesia will be discussed later in this article. 
 
Another possible problem with parrhesia is that teachers who are clearly independent and 
outspoken may be seen as an undermining influence on a school’s educational mandate. 
However, this problem seems less likely to occur if teachers in their practice of parrhesia 
show their colleagues and the authorities that their frank speech implies a constructive critique 
of public demands, which is necessary for the education and development of students. 
 
If students are not open and sincere towards their teachers, it is difficult for the teachers to 
really understand how their teaching is experienced and whether their knowledge is relevant. 
Straightforward and honest feedback will reveal whether teachers are enhancing their 
students’ learning, critical reflection and understanding. Teachers therefore also need the 
students to act as parrhesiastes. From this perspective, teaching and learning not only are 
instruments for a better mastery of people or things but also encompass a broader scope - 
namely, a way of life, a self-cultivation. Inspired by Greco-Roman reasoning, Foucault (1983: 
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24) asserted that frankness, independence and openness alone were not considered sufficient 
in classical times. If a man in the classical Greek states spoke without wisdom, he was 
considered either foolish or insane. To be worthy of parrhesia, a man’s reasoning therefore 
had to be based upon mathesis (i.e., learning and wisdom) and paideia (i.e., intellectual and 
moral cultivation). These aspects of reasoning seem to be highly relevant in an educational 
setting. Familiarity with what makes knowledge true, authoritative and convincing (mathesis) 
is necessary if students and teachers are to have substantial, open and critical discussions 
about knowledge, achieve paideia and strengthen their reflective autonomous behaviour. 
Based on these premises, students may practise parrhesia and, in so doing, provide benefits to 
each other and to their teachers. By practicing parrhesia, students are in a position to compare 
and contrast their understanding of knowledge with each other, the basis being the teaching 
they have received. This sharing of knowledge may provide insight into the different 
perspectives represented by their particular (possibly multicultural) ‘voices’. 
 
The ’parrhesiastic contract’: A premise for frankness and autonomy in learning 
situations 
For professionals to be granted autonomy presupposes that they are regarded as trustworthy. 
In classical times, individuals believed that trust in the message put forth by teachers would 
be weakened if there was a lack of consistency between what the teachers taught and the life 
they led and between what they said and what they did – that is, between logos and bios 
(Foucault 1983: 37-39). In classical times, a teacher who acted consistently was called a 
basanos. Such a man was regarded as a model because he not only insisted on frankness but 
also proved to be receptive to critique. Foucault drew attention to Socrates as an example of a 
’basanos of other people’s lives’. Thus, in accordance with a classical Greek line of 
reasoning, being rich in knowledge and advocating openness were not enough. One must, as a 
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teacher, also demonstrate that one is able to tolerate others who show openness and opposition 
towards oneself. However, establishing such a relationship is not easy. As previously 
mentioned, being frank towards people who are more powerful than oneself always poses a 
risk. Foucault once again argued that people in classical Greek societies can be an inspiration. 
According to Foucault (1983: 4-5), those living in classical times were considered to practise 
parrhesia only if a risk or danger connected with saying what one meant to be true existed. 
Translated to a contemporary educational context, teachers who tell the truth to their students 
are not said to practise parrhesia if there is no risk connected with what they do. By contrast, 
teachers who are dedicated to the care of themselves and others and who tell a disturbing, 
shocking or irritating truth to students, parents or their leaders, and thus risk being sanctioned, 
prove their frankness and are said to practise parrhesia. Therefore, an important aspect of 
practising parrhesia is the presence of risk in the face of pressures toward normalisation and 
in defence of reflective autonomy.  
 
Taking inspirations from Foucault’s later thinking, teachers might also use parrhesia to 
inspire their students to engage in conversations in which they discuss and criticise the 
teaching they have received. Parrhesia has thus significance as a special confrontational 
critique, either towards others or oneself, thereby possibly strengthening both aspects of 
personal reflective autonomy. According to Foucault (1983: 5) parrhesia always exists in 
situations where those who speak are recognised to be in an inferior position in relation to 
their conversation partners. Foucault repeatedly emphasised that parrhesia always comes 
from below and is directed upwards. Being frank with students probably does not often pose a 
risk for teachers: however, there are situations in which it can. If students do not like what 
their teachers say or do, the students may obstruct their teachers’ initiatives and undermine 
their legitimacy. To be a parrhesiastes, it is necessary to know that one occupies a 
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subordinate position. Hence, students do not fulfil the role of parrhesiastes if they openly 
criticise a teacher but do not know that the teacher whom they criticise is the individual whom 
the criticism concerns. Being critical of an individual in authority or of a system is not enough 
if one is to practise parrhesia truly. A person who is committed to practicing parrhesia must 
also be willing to criticise openly and directly those individuals who are in power and, in such 
a manner, to challenge the pressure towards normalisation that exists. In Foucault’s later 
writings (1991: 14-15), the ancient Greeks and their commitment to the practice of parrhesia 
represent a source of inspiration. 
 
The school provides a context for illustrating the practical significance of these ideas. 
Teachers who endeavour to develop into reflective autonomous professionals must receive 
straightforward and truthful feedback from their students. When teachers ask their students for 
feedback, the students may have good reasons for not adopting the role of a parrhesiastes and 
for not directly expressing their opinion about the relevance or value of the teaching they have 
received. Based on their experience, the students may come to the realisation that some of 
their teachers do not handle confrontation well. Consequently, the students may choose to say 
just what they believe these teachers would like to hear. At issue is how teachers should act so 
as to promote parrhesia in such a manner that frankness, reflective autonomy and openness 
can be possible and that the normalisation pressure can be weakened. According to Foucault 
(1983: 30, 51-54), it is not merely fear that may represent an obstacle to students’ truth telling. 
Students may also see personal advantages in not revealing what they really mean. They may 
desire to impress, or they may want to build a close relationship with an individual who has 
power, or they may hope to gain benefits that they otherwise would not have received. The 
question raised in classical literature is how those individuals with power, who desire honesty 
and truthful answers that can promote their reflectivity, can avoid being seduced.  
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A major problem here is a weakness for flattery, or desire for self-glorification. Plutarch 
described the difficulties of distinguishing a real parrhesiastes from those who flatter when 
one is deceived by self-glorification. In other words, it is not merely that one might be 
deceived by those who flatter; one can also be confused by one’s own flattery (i.e., ’self-
love’). Nonetheless, Foucault believed that something can be done. An individual who is truly 
seeking truth and honesty should look for someone who is willing to speak not only with, but 
against, this individual. With reference to Plutarch, Foucault (1983: 51, 52) described this 
type of person as someone who does not merely play ’the part of a friend’ and who 
’constantly [is] on the move from place to place, and changes his shape to fit his receiver’. An 
apparent parrhesiastes is one who offers only positive feedback and is afraid to provide 
opposition, whereas a real parrhesiastes is one who offers both positive and negative 
feedback and has the courage to provide opposition. Those who wish to practise parrhesia 
and augment their independence and autonomy in relation to others must strive to be 
parrhesiastes in the full sense.  
 
Teachers who genuinely want to stimulate self-reflection and to receive truthful answers 
about how their teaching is experienced by their students might explicitly invite their students 
to offer opposing views and be open to using parrhesia in conversations in the classroom. 
Students must feel assured that they can be frank and critical in offering comments to their 
teachers on the teaching they have experienced. Foucault (1983: 10) described how citizens in 
classical times reached this kind of agreement, which he referred to as ’the parrhesiastic 
contract’. Leaders in classical times who had power utilised such contracts when they lacked 
knowledge of what was true: Individuals who possessed power approached those who knew 
what was true but were without power. Those without power were told that if they told what 
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was true, they would not be punished, irrespective of how unwelcome the truth might be. 
However, in ancient Greek drama, an element of doubt always existed. For instance, 
individuals with power may lack the capacity to control themselves when confronted with the 
candour of others. For a parrhesiastes, this risk has to be calculated when the parrhesiastic 
contract is reached. Parrhesia is ‘the courage of the truth’ on the part of the parrhesiastes 
when faced with the risk of receiving negative reactions. Foucault (1991) contended that 
individuals in modern society have something important to learn from people in classical 
times about how they can develop reflection and independence and make room for frank and 
truthful communication. The following examples from the practice of teaching seek to 
illustrate this point. 
 
Different approaches to parrhesia amongst teachers and students 
When teachers practise self-criticism in public and encourage their students to criticise their 
teaching, students are given an indication that they too can practise parrhesia. Teachers can 
go a step further by helping students articulate their needs, their perceptions of the teaching 
conditions and their desires. In addition, teachers can assure their students that they can 
critically reflect on their teachers’ activities in public. An indication that parrhesia is present 
in the teaching context occurs when both experts and non-experts (in this context, both 
teachers and students) are given the opportunity to develop and practise their autonomy within 
a frank, argumentative conversation. 
 
Such an approach can, however, be criticised for not adequately taking into consideration how 
arguments are always connected with human interests and power (Foucault 1986: 151, 203). 
Students can be swept away by their teachers’ well-argued definitions, diagnoses and 
arguments instead of considering the relevance of their own less articulated perspectives. 
However, parrhesia also implies that insight can result when tolerance is extended to 
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individuals who practise parrhesia and express themselves in a sudden, astonishing and 
unpredictable way. Such an unconditional form of parrhesia is described in classical literature 
as thought-provoking. It can also be unexpected and shocking. Foucault (1983: 47) uncovered 
this form of parrhesia when he analysed a dialogue between Diogenes ( a parrhesiastes) and 
Alexander. Alternatively, this form of parrhesia can mean acting in a confrontational, 
unpredictable and suggestive manner. Socrates exhibited this form of parrhesia when he 
insightfully called attention to the the lack of consistency between his conversation partners’ 
opinions and their lifestyle. According to Foucault (1983: 37), Socrates, as a teacher, 
characteristically demonstrated to his students the degree to which ’there is a relation between 
the rational discourse, the logos, you are able to use, and the way that you live. Socrates is 
inquiring into the way that logos give form to a person’s style of life’. However, it is worth 
noting that the parrhesiastes is first and foremost speaking with and not for others. 
Consequently, parrhesia can make way for the development of an individual’s reflective 
autonomy. 
 
Parrhesia and knowledge in action: A matter of kairos 
However, teachers cannot just lean back and rely on their acquired knowledge and experience. 
Occasionally, unexpected events and situations, which are full of risk and which have not 
been encountered previously, arise. In these types of events and situations, frankness and 
courage are necessary to grasp the opportunities, the best moments. The ancient Greeks 
referred to this ability as kairos. In classical literature kairos is described as requiring a 
special relationship to one’s practice of parrhesia (Foucault 1983: 42). On this analysis 
teachers must possess humility, and also an experimental approach, in applying their own 
knowledge and skills. Furthermore, a high degree of attention is required towards the 
particular factors that always characterise a given situation. In addition, they must be sensitive 
towards the challenges to be faced, in light of the dynamics that are active within the context. 
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Kairos and parrhesia are sustained through responding sincerely to the inherent demands of 
such challenges, not through reference to a virtuous order that is external to social practices. 
 
It can be concluded that autonomous teachers must not merely know the right things and be 
capable of acting adequately at the right moments. They must also dare to use their informed 
discretion in confronting conventional practice, thereby seeking new solutions and elevating 
students’ understanding. Thus, good teaching implies more than just replication and 
application of knowledge that is learned in teacher education. Following the classical 
tradition, modern research shows that good teaching also presupposes an interpretative and 
associative use of professional knowledge to fit the particular context one is dealing with 
(Eraut 1994). However, because contexts are not permanent, they can be challenged. Teachers 
practise a parrhesia that includes kairos when they dare to deviate from the accustomed and 
familiar in the educational setting and introduce new rules and procedures, so as to make their 
students’ education richer and encourage their empowerment, learning and understanding. 
Teacher education could prepare for this by giving student teachers some initial capability in 
practising parrhesia. 
 
Parrhesia, self-examination and reflective practice 
Based on Foucault’s explorations of parrhesia I have in this article tried to show how 
professionals can develop an ethics of the self that can further their personal reflective 
autonomy and confront the pressure of normalisation that is ever-present in the school system. 
However, Foucault’s idea of an ethics of the self has a broader scope of relevance to 




In his researches on classical thinkers, Foucault (1983: 55-63) identifies different forms of 
self-examination and self-investigation that an individual may use so as to maintain one’s 
reflective autonomy and further develop the ethics of the self. Individuals are drawn to 
investigate how one thinks, what one is occupied with, what the blind paths are and what 
leads to greater degrees of critical self-reflection and systematic criticism. According to 
Foucault these inspections will help one achieve a peace of mind that may lead to better self-
control. Moreover, he highlighted the necessity of exposing oneself to trials so as to determine 
to what degree one makes space for parrhesia, what obstructs oneself as a person from acting 
as a parrhesiastes and what prevents others from practising it. To master these exercises, a 
number of classical texts recommend adopting a critical stance to one’s self by regularly 
stopping one’s work, stepping back and looking at it from a distance.  
The value of adopting a critically reflective stance to one’s practice has been a central theme 
in modern research on professions. Like in the classical understanding of parrhesia, 
distinctions are drawn in the so-called ’reflective practice movement’ today amongst 
reflections before, during and after the action (Schön 1987, van Manen 1995). Furthermore, in 
accordance with the classical tradition a line is drawn between reflecting upon one’s own 
practice and reflecting upon how social and cultural factors influence that practice (van 
Manen 1995, Zeichner 1994). Foucault’s researches are more probing however than most of 
the research literature on professional education. It is not critical reflection as such that 
preoccupied him. Reflection without mathesis and paideia can, as Foucault showed, 
undermine parrhesia and obstruct professional practice. Nonetheless, this notion scarcely 
features as a theme in research associated with the ’reflective practitioner’ movement, as 




Foucault underlined that parrhesia is not associated with force but rather with freedom and 
personal autonomy. To outline particular procedures for parrhesia within the teaching 
profession would be to undermine the kind of a frank, independent and reflective practice that 
parrhesia is in itself. Foucault embarked upon an ethical errand in his works. He wanted to 
show how certain ethical practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans in handling political, 
social and educational dilemmas can contribute towards a break with modernity’s normalising 
discourses and make way for more autonomy (i.e., in a way that implies taking care of the self 
and others). The object of this article has been to discuss possible implications for teachers’ 
professional practice. If the ideas of Foucault are taken up, the correct answers cannot simply 
be appropriated from classical texts. One can surely find inspiration from them, however: if 
there is anything these texts show, it is that what is correct varies from individual to 
individual. The different discussions of parrhesia in classical texts always deal with answers 
to actual challenges faced by individuals in the special situations in which they find 
themselves.  Just as Foucault sought to illustrate the notion of parrhesia with telling examples 
from classical Greek sources, todays’ research might find telling material for research on 
parrhesia in the concrete predicaments that regularly arise in schools, colleges and other 
environments of formal learning (i.e. critical case studies). It is in this practical sense that 
Foucault suggests to his readers that they explore the relevance of parrhesia for their own 
professional practice.   
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